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Section 341, the collapsible corporations provision of the In-
ternal Revenue Code' does not yield its meaning to a simple read-
-ing. Concepts and complexities mount with each phrase until, well
befbre the section has run its course, their accumulated weight ap-
proaches the unbearable. Within the scope of this comment, there-
fore, only a limited look will be attempted, with the points of focus
being those areas of the statute most likely to be involved in liti-
gation. The over-all purpose here may be stated simply, however:
Ever}r sale or redemption of stock of a closely held corporation, and
every liquidation distribution from such a corporation, must be
tested against the provisions of section 341. If the section applies,
an expected capital gain will be converted into ordinary income, and
the possible application of the section may immediately involve the
stockholder or his attorney in all the complexities to be noted.2
* Member of the North Carolina Bar, Charlotte, North Carolina.
: INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341. This provision of current law was car-
ried forward substantially unchanged from section 117(m) of the 1939 Code,
with the outstanding exception of the addition of section 341 (e) by the
Revenue Act of 1958. References hereafter will be made to section 341, with-
out regard to the taxable year involved, except in instances where differences
in statutory language would be relevant. In those instances precise statutory
reference will be made.
2 Many of the cases which have had section 341 applied have been cases
involving loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). In
these FHA cases the loan would be in excess of the cost of the project and
either the excess of the loan over the project cost would be received by a
shareholder as a distribution of capital or the stock in the corporation would
be sold and capital gain reported.
Sometimes the corporation would be organized with Class A and Class B
stock. After receipt of the total loan proceeds and before the corporation
had earnings, the Class B stock would be redeemed for the excess loan pro-
ceeds. The early redemption would eliminate the possibility of the distri-
bution being taxed as a dividend because of the absence of earnings and ac-
cumulated surplus.
In almost all these cases the courts have decided against the taxpayers.
Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 65
(1963); Short v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1962), affirming
35 T.C. 922 (1961); Pomponio v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 827 (4th Cir.
1961), affirming 33 T.C. 1072 (1960); Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d
554 (2d Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C. 723 (1959); Jacobson v. Commis-
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The origin of section 341, stated broadly, was a Congressional
intent to put an end to certain-sometimes successful-efforts to
convert ordinary income into capital gain through the interim use of a
corporate entity followed by income realization by the individuals
who owned and controlled the corporation, The statutory machine
erected to serve this police purpose does not address itself. to taxing
the corporation involved; but, instead, directs itself squarely at the
income consequence to the shareholder. - In sharply selective quota-
tion, section 341 reads as follows:
(a) TREATmENT OF. GAIN TO SHAREHoLDaR .- Gain from-
(1) the sale or exchange of stock of a collapsible corporation,
(2) a distribution in partial or complete liquidation of a
collapsible corporation, which distribution is treated under this
part as in part or full payment in exchange for stock, and
(3) a distribution made by a collapsible corporation which,
under section 301(c) (3) (A), is treated, to the extent it exceeds
the basis of the stock, in the same manner as a gain from the sale
or exchange of property,
to the, extent that it would [otherwise be treated as a long term
capital gain] ... shall, except as provided in subsection (d), be
sioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960), reversing 32 T.C. 893 (1959); Bryan
v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960), affirming 32 T.C. 104
(1959); Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960), affirming
32 T.C. 782 (1959); Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960),
affirming 30 T.C. 1155 (1958); Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th
Cir. 1959), affirming 30 T.C. 1044 (1958); August v. Commissioner, 267
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1959), affirming 30 T.C. 969 (1958); Abbott v. Commis-
sioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958), affirming 28 T.C. 795 (1957); Glick-
man v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958), affirming 26 P.H. TAX
CT. MEm. 451 (1957); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.
1958), affirming 28 T.C. 246 (1957); Jesse-Hartman, 34 T.C. 1085 (1960);
Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959); Carl B. Rechner, 30 T.C. 186(1958); Louis Alper, 30 P.H. TAX CT. MEM. 1780 (1961); David Bass,
28 P.H. TAX CT. Mm. 59 (1959);
Numerous articles and comments have been written on the many phases
of the definition of a collapsible corporation by itself, not to mention the
articles dealing specifically with other portions of section 341 of the Code.
Axelrad, Tax Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporations and Part-
nerships, 34 TAxs 841 (1956); Boland, Practical Problems of the Collaps-
ible Corporation, N.Y.U. 10TH INST. oN FED. TAx 537 (1952); Greenfield,
Effect of Collapsible Corporations on Real Property Holdings, N.Y.U. 10TH1
INST. ON FED. TAx 91 (1952).; MacLean, Collapsible Corporations-The
Statute and Regulations, 67 HARv. L. Rv. 55 (1953); Weithorn, Collaps-
ible Corporations:-1960 Status, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. oN FED. TAx 593
(1961); See Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904, 908 n.11 (5th Cir.
1961), for an extensive list of articles on this section. See also Donaldson,
Collapsible Corporations, 36 TAxEs 777 (1958) which presents a concise
discussion of the few major parts of the section prior to 1958,
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considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property which
is not a capital asset.
(b) DEFINITIONS
(1) COLLAPSIBLE CORP RATION.-For purposes of this sec-
tion, the term "collapsible corporation" means a corporation
formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction,
or production of property, for the purchase of property which (in
the hands of the corporation) is property described in paragraph
(3), or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or
availed of, with a view to-
(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders
(whether in liquidation or otherwise), or a distribution to its
shareholders, before the realization by the corporation manufac-
turing, constructing, producing, or purchasing the property of a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such
property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attri-
butable to such property.
(2) PRODUCTION OR PURCHASE OF PROPERTY.-For pur-
poses of paragraph (1), a corporation shall be deemed to have
manufactured, constructed, produced, or purchased property, if-
(A) it engaged in the manufacture, construction, or
production of such property to any extent,
(B) it holds property having a basis determined, in
whole or in part, by reference to the cost of such property in the
hands of a person who manufactured, constructed, produced, or
purchased the property, or
(C) it holds property having a basis determined, in
whole or in part, by reference to the cost of property manu-
factured, constructed, produced, or purchased by the corporation.
(3) SECTION 341 AssET.-For purposes of this section,
the term "section 341 assets" means property held for a period
of less than 3 years which is-
(c) PRESUMPTION IN CERTAIN CASES.-
(d) LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATION OF SECTION.-In the case of
gain realized by a shareholder with respect to his stock in a col-
lapsible corporation, this section shall not apply-
(1) unless, at any time after the commencement of the
manufacture, construction, or production of the property, or at
the time of the purchase of the property described in subsection
(b) (3) or at any time thereafter, such shareholder (A) owned
[Vol. 42
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(or was considered as owning) more than 5 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation, or (B) owned stock
which was considered as owned at such time by another share-
holder who then owned (or was considered as owning) more than
5 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation;
(2) to the gain recognized during a taxable year, unless
more than 70 percent of such gain is attributable to the property
so manufactured, constructed, produced, or purchased; and
(3) to gain realized after the expiration of 3 years following
the completion of such manufacture, construction, production or
purchase.
(e) EXCEPTIONS TO APPLICATION OF SECTION.- 3
Four major areas of battle have developed under section 341-
being indicated by the emphasized portions of the quoted statutory
language. Stated in the form of questions, the major points of issue
are these: (1) When is a corporation "formed or availed of" for
activities and purposes condemned by section 341? (2) What are
the limits in time and activity of the "manufacture, construction, or
production" of property, within the meaning of section 341? (3)
What nature or purpose or intention is comprehended by the re-
quirement of "a view to" sale or exchange, etc., and when must that
purpose exist, in order for the "view" to be one condemned by
section 341 ? (4) What is meant by a sale or exchange, etc., "before
the realization.., of a substantial part of the taxable income' to be
derived from the property, i.e., is the condemnation limited to sales
or exchanges which precede the realization of any substantial part
of the derivable income, or is the condemnation much broader so
that it reaches sales or exchanges which come at a time while a
substantial part of the derivable income remains unrealized by the
corporation?
I. THE AFFAIRS OF MR. A
By way of illustrating how all four problem areas just noted may
have bearing on the affairs of an average business man, the facts of
a common transaction may be used. Mr. A, resident in a growing
city recently purchased a tract of land near a proposed shopping
center. His purpose for the purchase was to enjoy an expected in-
crease in land values, and, if possible, to accelerate that increase by
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341(a)-(e). (Emphasis added.)
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securing a zoning change for the land from residential to either
business or office institution. Mr. A also had in mind, if his zoning
change came through, the erection of a commercial building on the
tract.
Mr. A either acquired land in a corporation owned by himself
and his immediate family, or he 'purchased the land individually and
then transferred it to the family corporation. After success before
the zoning board, the corporation started construction of an office
building. Shortly after the building was ready for occupancy, an-
other investor approached Mr. A and offered an excellent price for
the land and building., Mr. A, keeping in mind that he had been
told always to buy assets and sell stock, and, as the realty involved
was the only asset of the family corporation, he declined to have
the corporation sell the realty-but he countered with a proposal
to sell all of the stock of the corporation to the generous second in-
vestor.
At the time Mr. A first decided to build on the land he was con-
vinced that such a development would be a good long-term invest-
ment. The price offered by the second investor, however, was so
favorable as to lead him to sell. When he made his counter-offer,
for' sale of stock at a favorable price, he gave no particular thought
to the timing of income from the building; but, instead, considered
only the margin of profit available to him. He thought of that profit
as arising largely from his success in securing a zoning change and
in erecting a quality building for a reasonable cost.
Mr. A has never before purchased or built or sold any form of
real property, and the proposed stock sale will also be the first in
his history. Nonetheless, due to section 341, it is possible that his
profit on sale of the stock will be taxable as ordinary income. This
unhappy result, wholly independent of any trade or business engage-
ment by Mr. A,' would be almost certain if the stock sale involved
were one taking place before September 2, 1958, as the possibility
of relief under section 341 (e) would not then exist.5 Even for years
following the effective date of the exceptions granted by this section,
however, there remains a danger of ordinary income treatment-
as the reach of the section has not yet been clearly established.
'Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374
U.S. 65 (1963) ; United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961).
As indicated by the text, subsection (e) of section 341 of the Code was
promulgated as a separate entity in 1958.
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In general in cases such as the preceditig example, and as will'"
be noted at some length hereafter, the purpose of section 341.(e).qi
to make section 341 inapplicable where the questioned gain on sale
of stock or on distribution is attributable primarily to assets which
would have produced only long-term capital gain if they had been
sold directly by the corporation or by its principal shareholders (had
those assets been owned directly by the principle shareholdersy.
Apart from possible protection by subsection (e), however,- Mr. A
must test his proposed stock sale against the provisions of the first
four subsections of section 341-and in so, doing he must be aware of•
the four problem areas noted above. Separate discussion of those four
areas of interest seems called for and will be taken up in their order
of immediate importance.
II. THE "VIEw" AREA
It is fairly well settled that there must be a "bad view" in order
for this section to come into play.6 The courts, in analyzing what
constitutes such a view, have pointed to some factors in the evidence
indicating its existence.' However, the regulations and court de-
cisions still leave this area in semidarkness. The statute itself states
that it is a "view to" a certain type of sale or exchange or distribu-
tion, namely a "sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders... or a
distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by the cor-
poration manufacturing, constructing, producing or purchasing the
property of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived
from such property.... ." That the taxpayer, even as a member of the
group of shareholders, had a view to selling stock in a corporation
which had constructed property is not alone sufficient. Where the
Farber v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963); Abbott v. Com-
missioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958); Glickman v. Commissioner,' 256"
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.
1958); Edward Weil, 28 T.C. 809 (1957), aft'd, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cii.
1958).
" Lack of realization of any of the income to be derived from the propeity,
Farber v. Commissioner, supra note 6; existence of two classes of stock at
incorporation, Epstein v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Ohio 1963)
issuance and redemption of class B stock, Burge v. Commissioner, supra
note 6; sale by architect of $219,401 par value of stock to taxpayer for
$16,750, Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960). But see
Honaker DrIg., Inc. v. Koehler, 190 F. Supp. 287 (D.C. Kan. 1960) where
the fact that the individuals would have realized capital gains had they sold
the property influenced the court to find an absence of view. -
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taxpayer's decision to sell his stock is not geared to the statutory
reasons, section 341 should not come into play. Thus there can
be a "good view" to selling as well as a bad one.' Pursuant to this
fact of statutory construction, the Commissioner's regulations es-
tablish a presumption that the corporation is not collapsible if the
sale, exchange or distribution is attributable solely to circumstances
which arose after the construction or which could not be reasonably
anticipated at the time of construction. 9
The Internal Revenue Service would eliminate the necessity of
having a "bad" motive in making the sale, exchange or distribution.
Attempting to make its task much easier, the Service has argued that
if a sale, exchange or distribution took place within the prohibited
period, the motive of the taxpayer is immaterial. This approach has
been bolstered by the suggestion that there would be chaos in at-
tempting to apply section 341 if proof of good motive for selling
could overcome the statute.10 Other sections of the Code often re-
'Ralph J. Solow, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. 63,087 (1963)
(co-owners disagreed and one sold to the other); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C.
906 (1961) (angina attack after prior refusals to sell); Charles J. Riley,
35 T.C. 848 (1961) (doctor advised petitioner to take more exercise). Cf.
Sylvester J. Lowery, 39 T.C. No. 100 (March 21, 1963) (two corporations
were collapsible and two not collapsible, implying a "good view" as to the
latter). "In our opinion section 117(m) was not intended to apply where,
as here, a minority shareholder is compelled, because of circumstances over
which he had no control, to dispose of his investment in a corporation which
is thereafter continued in operation by the majority shareholders. The leg-
islative history does not indicate it was so intended and we are aware of no
case which has held otherwise." Id. at 12.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955), provides that: "A corporation is
formed or availed of with a view to the action described in section 341(b)
if the requisite view existed at any time during the manufacture, production,
construction, or purchase referred to in that section. Thus, if the sale, ex-
change, or distribution is attributable solely to circumstances which arose
after the manufacture, construction, production, or purchase (other than cir-
cumstances which reasonably could be anticipated at the time of such manu-
facture, construction, production, or purchase), the corporation shall, in
the absence of compelling facts to the contrary, be considered not to have
been so formed or availed of. However, if the sale, exchange or distribu-
tion is attributable to circumstances present at the time of the manufacture,
construction, production, or purchase, the corporation shall, in the absence of
compelling facts to the contrary, be considered to have been so formed or
availed of."
See cases cited note 7 supra.
'" See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
"0 Nordberg, "Collapsible" Corporations and the "View," 40 TAxEs 372,
379 contends "if, as suggested, a compelling fact to the contrary could negate
the presence of the prohibited view and thereby prevent the application of
Section 341, chaos would reign supreme. In every situation the court or jury
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quire the existence of an improper motive -- thus permitting
the taxpayer to show subjectively that a certain section is not ap-
plicable to him. Even though the statute provides for a presump-
tion of collapsibility,12 as applied to section 341 the establishment of a
would be called upon to determine the presence or absence of the magic
"compelling factor to the contrary."
Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5(b) (1955), list the facts which will ordinarily cause
collapsible section problems:
"The following facts will ordinarily be considered sufficient (except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (a) of this section and paragraph (c) of
this section) to establish that a corporation is a collapsible corporation:
(1) A shareholder of the corporation sells or exchanges his stock
or receives a liquidating distribution, or a distribution described in sec-
tion 301(c) (3) (A).
(2) Upon such sale, exchange, or distribution, such shareholder
realizes gain attributable to the property described in subparagraphs (4)
and (5) of this paragraph, and
(3) At the time of the manufacture, construction, production, or pur-
chase of the property described in subparagraphs (4) and (5) of this
paragraph, such activity was substantial in relation to the other activi-
ties of the corporation which manufactured, constructed, produced, or
purchased such property.
The property referred to in subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph is
that property or the aggregate of those properties which meet the following
two requirements:
(4) The property is manufactured, constructed, or produced by the
corporation or by another corporation stock of which is held by the
corporation, or is property purchased by the corporation or by such other
corporation which (in the hands of the corporation holding such property)
is property described in section 341(b) (3), and
(5) At the time of the sale, exchange, or distribution described in sub-
paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the corporation which manufactured,
constructed, produced, or purchased such property has not realized a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such property.
In the case of property which is a unit of an integrated project involving
several properties similar in kind, the rules of this subparagraph shall be
applied to the aggregate of the properties constituting the single project
rather than separately to such unit. Under the rules of this subparagraph,
a corporation shall be considered a collapsible corporation by reason of
holding stock in other corporations which manufactured, constructed, pro-
duced, or purchased the property only if the activity of the corporation in
holding stock in such other corporations is substantial in relation to the
other activities of the corporation."
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269 (acquisitions made to evade or avoid
income tax), 302(c) (acquisition of stock within a 10-year period), 532(a)
(accumulated earnings tax on corporation "formed or availed of" to avoid
income tax).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (c). However, this presumption does not
materially assist the Commissioner. See Jack D. Saltzman, P-H TAX CT.
REP. & MEm. DEC. 63,080 (1963), where the Tax Court felt "that the evi-
dence in this case which is sufficient to overcome the presumption of cor-
1964]
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"good view" should thus bring the taxpayer out from under the
statute. Any other interpretation of the Congressional intent in
using the word "view" would strike many unwary taxpayers in the
tax pocketbook where their intent to sell was based on something
else, such as a heart attack which renders them unable to continue.
In Shilowits v. United States,13 the government attempted to
remove from the intent to sell any consideration of motive. There
the petitioner, an architect, had entered into an arrangement with a
builder to build two apartment projects for investment. Approxi-
mately seven: months after construction had begun, the petitioner
suffered a heart attack. Later, before the project was complete, ad-
ditional financing was needed and the petitioner was unable to sup-
ply the funds. The builder then demanded sole ownership on the
grounds that he was to have the responsibility of obtaining the addi-
tional funds. The petitioner then had no choice but to sell the stock
of the two corporations to the builder. On trial, the Government con-
tended that the sale of stock which was induced by circumstances
present during the period of construction, occurred before construc-
tion was completed and that this was sufficient per se to make the
sale that of stock in a collapsible corporation. Relying completely
upon this theory the Government did not even assert that the requi-
site view was present, i.e., that there was any motive for sale other
than .the heart attack and the builder's insistence that the petitioner
withdraw from the venture. By this argument a sale after construc-
tion is completed, attributable to circumstances present during con-
struction would be placed on different footing from such a sale which
took place during construction. A further broadening of the ap-
plicability of the section was thus requested. By following the
Government's line of reasoning, any sale prior to completion of con-
struction of stock in a corporation otherwise meeting the definition
of a collapsible corporation would thus automatically make the cor-
poration collapsible. Since Congress did not add a proviso or a
special subsection to this part of the Code to state that sales during
construction, production or manufacture would eliminate the neces-
rectness of respondent's determination is also sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion created by section 341(c)." Id. at 384.
The taxpayer failed to overcome the presumption of correctness in Arthur
Sorin, 29 T.C. 959 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 271 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1959),
when he could not show that the requirements of the statute were lacking.
" 221 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1963).
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sity of possessing the proscribed view, the New Jersey District Court
properly refused to adopt the unwarranted limitation on the require-
ment of a bad view, stating:
In fact, it is difficult to conceive how, in rational application of
the Regulation, the time element of the sale of stock, standing
alone and apart from circumstances inducing it, could be con-
sidered a determining factor in whether gain realized should be
treated as capital gain or ordinary income.14
One of the best statements as to kind of intent or motive out of
which the view to sale, exchange or distribution must come was
stated by one writer as early as 1952. It clearly expresses the sub-
jective state:
Yet, the literal wording of the Statute seems to require that the
shareholders of a collapsible corporation must have in mind at
some time during the production of the property an idea of with-
drawing from the enterprise prior to realization at the corporate
level of a substantial part of the anticipated gain from the prop-
erty thus produced. 15
This definition immediately brings us to a consideration of spe-
cific taxpayer motive. The courts have been conscious of good mo-
tives since the statute was first enacted. Little by little, however,
there have been inroads made on the requirement of intent or motive
by decisions directly ignoring the requirement of motive,' 6 by con-
tinuous Commissioner urging of narrower interpretation, 1 7 and by
1
'Id. at 184.
1 Boland, Practical Problems of the Collapsible Corporation, N.Y.U.
10TH INsT. ON FED. TAx 537, 549 (1952). Another explanation of the view
is in 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOmE TAxATioN § 22.58, at 251 (1958): "The
'view' or intent, which is required to be present at the proper time in the
proper minds, is to do two things: to collapse the corporation or the invest-
ment before the corporation realizes a 'substantial' part of the 'taxable in-
come' to be derived from the collapsible property; and to arrange for the
stockholders to realize the income." This is the Tax Court's view, Jack D.
Saltzman, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 63,080 (1963).
"The question is, therefore, whether at the time the apartment building
was purchased, One Fifteen had a view to distributing the asset to pe-
titioner before the realization by One Fifteen of a substantial part of the
taxable income to be derived from such property, and- the* realization by
petitioner of gain attributable to such property." Id. at 383.
" E.g., James B. Kelley, 32 T.C. 135 (1959), aff'd, 293 F.2d 904 (5th
Cir. 1961), where the court decided on the basis that a substantial part of
the income had actually been realized, and never reached a consideration of
view.
,. Shilowitz v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J. 1963).
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
dicta,'8 later available for urging by the Commissioner to be the
established rule. Indeed courts have had a tendency to shortcut the
full definition of a collapsible corporation by stating that as long as
there was a view to selling during construction, the corporation was
collapsible, 19 or so long as there was a view to sale after construction
and the circumstances had not changed, the corporation was col-
lapsible,20 or so long as there was a view after completion of con-
struction to sale and circumstances had not changed since completion
of construction, the corporation was collapsible.2
Suppose a taxpayer, after his solely-owned corporation built an
office building, without change of circumstances since completion and
after receiving approximately five per cent of the estimated income
18 Even United States v. Ivey, 294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961) said "and
the corporation may be 'availed of with a view to' effecting a tax avoidance
scheme." Id. at 806. Only when the courts indicate that there is something
left out between "availed of" and "with a view to" will dicta not be used
improperly.
" Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 825 (1960), quoted the shortened version of the "availed of" theory
in Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958), affirming 28 T.C.
246 (1957), which left out "for construction"; then indicated two different
stages of "view"-one when the corporation was formed, another when it
was "availed of." Both cases seem to say that "formed or availed of for con-
struction" means "formed for construction" or "availed of for sale." Cer-
tainly this is not within the statute.
"0 See Burge v. Commissioner, supra note 19.
" Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958), implying that
the existence of the view at the time of availing for sale was sufficient, ig-
noring the normally accepted premise that "availing" applies to "for con-
struction." Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (4) (1955), indicates that the requisite
view in order to make a corporation collapsible must exist with respect to
property, and lends weight to the position that the view is a subjective con-
sideration of receipt of income and its relationship to the time of sale:
"The property referred to in section 341(b) is that property or the aggre-
gate of those properties with respect to which the requisite view existed.
In order to ascertain the property or properties as to which the requisite
view existed, reference shall be made to each property as to which, at the
time of the sale, exchange, or distribution referred to in section 341(b) there
has not been a realization by the corporation manufacturing, constructing,
producing, or purchasing the property of a substantial part of the taxable
income to be derived from such property. However, where any such property
is a unit of an integrated project involving several properties similar in kind,
the determination whether the requisite view existed shall be made only if a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from the project has not
been realized at the time of the sale, exchange, or distribution, and in such
case the determination shall be made by reference to the aggregate of the
properties constituting the single project."




from the project, sells the stock of the corporation at a considerable
profit (thirty percent) because he decides to shift from real estate
investment into the stock market. Assuming this sale takes place
within three years after completion, he will have an almost insur-
mountable task of proving to the courts that his decision to sell was
reached solely because of his desire to change his type of investment.
On those facts-standing by themselves-in the light of the two pre-
sumptions which bolster the Commissioner's position, he will at
best have protracted litigation, with the probability of losing the
case. This would be the result, even though the taxpayer never heard
of collapsible corporations or of section 341 and even though he
testified that he gave no consideration as to when his corporation
was to receive its income. A fortiori, with all of the apartments and
other housing projects being built often by a wholly-owned corpora-
tion, section 341 is immediately dangerous for anyone who changes
his mind in an apartment venture.
There is no absolute safeguard that can be put in the statutes to
protect such an individual and still protect the Commissioner in the
discharge of his responsibility for collecting revenue and preventing
circumvention of the taxing statutes unless by legal means. In the
illustrated situation, the Commissioner's determination would be
presumptively correct and the corporation would presumptively be
a collapsible corporation. Nevertheless, under the statute, the tax-
payer still has the right to overcome these presumptions by his own
evidence.
Going back into history to determine the original purpose of the
section22 it seems to the writer that, without question, in order for
the corporation to be collapsible, consideration must have been
given, in forming the view to sell, to the taxable income to be re-
ceived from the property constructed and the timing of the sale
before its actual receipt. The Commissioner's own regulations up-
hold this interpretation.28
"H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1950).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (2) (1955), provides that: "Under section
341(b) (1) the corporation must be formed or availed of with a view to the
action therein described, that is, the sale or exchange of its stock by its
shareholders, or a distribution to them prior to the realization by the corpora-
tion manufacturing, constructing, producing, or purchasing the property of
a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such property,
and the realization by the shareholders of gain attributable to such property."
See Epstein v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Ohio 1963), where
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.Under section 341 (b) (1) (A), the corporation must be formed
or availed of with a view to the action therein described, that is,
the sale or exchange of its stock by its shareholders, or a distribu-
tion to them prior to the "realization by the corporation... of a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such
* property .... "123a
"The requisite view is a subjective state of mind which must be
determined through assessing the objective facts."2 4 And it is in
.the question of a "view" (intent) was said to be "a subjective mental state
and one that is difficult to determine. This is particularly true where the
issue to be determined is the time when the subjective mental state was
originally developed." Id. at 486.
"
3
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 341(b) (1) (a).
"Jack D. Saltzman, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm. Dzc. 7 63,080 at 383
(1963), citing Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962).
The court emphasized its unwillingness to rely solely on the taxpayer's
version of his intent stating: "If petitioner's conclusion as to his intent were
required to be accepted in accordance with his statement, disposition of the
question here involved could be made on the basis of this testimony of peti-
tioner." Ibid. Involved here was a "purchase," not construction, of property.
But the petitioner in Charles J. Riley, 35 T.C. 848 (1961), gave uncon-
tradicted testimony about his intent to build for investment corroborated by
a real estate broker who testified of his refusal to sell, and by his doctor-
and carried his burden of proving the sale was attributable solely to circum-
stances arising subsequent to completion of construction. Five judges dis-
sented on the grounds that petitioner's testimony was unreliable and had no
impartial evidence to support it.
Although there is no requirement that the sale be made to outsiders, in
Sylvester J. Lowery, 39 T.C. No. 100 at 959 (1963), the court distinguished
between sales of all the outstanding stock to outsiders and a sale from a
minority stockholder to the majority.
"In the case of both Carver and Duval there was a sale of al of the stock
by all of the shareholders and it is clear that petitioner, in fact, shared in the
view of the majority of the shareholders to sell the stock prior to the reali-
zation by the corporations of any part of the net income to be derived from
the property." Id. at 9.
"One material distinction exists, however. In both Parkway and Raleigh,
those owning the majority of the stock and who were not only in a position
to, but did, in fact, control their policies, did not sell their stock but con-
tinued to operate the corporations. Neither corporation was availed of 'with
a view to' the action described in section 117(m) (2) (A), by those owning
a majority of the stock and controlling its policies. It necessarily follows that
petitioner did not 'share' in such a view. Neither corporation was 'col-
lapsible' or was ever in fact collapsed. The situation here presented is
distinguishable from those cases in which corporations have been held col-
lapsible even though the corporation as such continued in existence since,
in those cases, all shareholders sold their stock with a view, shared by all,
to the realization of gain prior to the realization by the corporation of a sub-
stantial part of the net income to be derived from the property constructed."
Id. at 10-11.
And yet Judge Opper, dissenting, keeps our eyes in focus on the "view"
[Vol. 42
COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
the assessment of the objective facts that the court must, as Con-
gress has prescribed, determine whether or not the intent was to .sell
before. realization of substantial income.2 5
Still addressing ourselves to the type of view which Congress in-
tended that the taxpayer possess to be brought within the provision
of section 341, it is certainly not a view to sell occasioned by a heart
attack and physician's advice;2 it is not a view to sell occasioned by
discovery of cracks in buildings shortly after completion ;27 it is not
a view, to sell occasioned by a doctor's advice to retire ;28 it is not a
view automatically inferred where the sole circumstance which
brought about the sale of the property is the enactment of legislation
by Congress after completion of the construction of the property.2 9
When must the view arise? Keeping in mind the basic purpose
of the statute at its inception in 1950 was aimed at devices whereby
one or more individuals attempt to convert the profits from their
participation' in a project from income taxable at ordinary rates to
the long term capital gains taxable only at a rate of twenty-five
per cent, it would seem that a view of selling the stock which arises
after the completion of the manufacture, construction or production,
or which is not in existence at the time of purchase of section 341
property, would not be a proscribed view within the statute. Yet this
of the individual shareholder, rather than the view of those controlling:
"The Court's opinion seems to me painted with much too broad a brush. The
fact that 'neither corporation was availed of 'with a view to' the action de-
scribed in section 117(m) (2) (A), by those owning a majority of the stock
and controlling its policies' does not 'necessarily' lead to the conclusion that
the corporation was not availed of by this petitioner with the requisite
'view.' Since the sale of stock is an individual matter, the 'view' of other
shareholders can have only evidentiary bearing on what was in petitioner's
mind." Id. at 13.2 Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374
U.S. 65 (1963).
" Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. 906 (1961). Here the taxpayer was bol-
stered by two heart attacks and prior reliance on his doctor. The taxpayer
had suffered a heart attack in 1947, and, on physician's advice, resigned from
a mortgage firm to build the apartment house involved in the collapsible
litigation. After advice from his physician following angina pains, taxpayer
signed the sales contract the next day.
"' Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960). Bolstering
the taxpayer's position a real estate broker was twice informed the proper-
ties were not for sale.
8 See Elliott v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 384 (D. Oregon 1962). The
case actually was decided on the ground that the view arose after completion.
" Rev. Rul. 57-575, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 236. The ruling makes such
broad assumptions that it is of little benefit to taxpayers generally.
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question remains open. The regulations state"° that the corporation
is formed or availed of with a view to the action described in the
section if the view existed at any time during the manufacture, con-
struction, production or purchase. The Braunstein cases' in the
Second Circuit unequivocally stated that the "view" to such sale or
distribution must exist at some time "during construction," citing
the Treasury's regulations."2 The Tax Court continues to agree
with its prior position and the Braunstein decision.8"
According to commentators and other decisions the only circuit
court which has implied that this view may arise subsequent to the
completion of construction is the Fourth Circuit. 4 However, an
" Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955), provides that: "A corporation is
formed or availed of with a view to the action described in section 341(b)
if the requisite view existed at any time during the manufacture, production,
construction, or purchase referred to in that section. Thus, if the sale, ex-
change, or distribution is attributable solely to circumstances which arose
after the manufacture, construction, production, or purchase (other than cir-
cumstances which reasonably could be anticipated at the time of such manu-
facture, construction, production, or purchase), the corporation shall, in
the absence of compelling facts to the contrary, be considered not to have
been so formed or availed of. However, if the sale, exchange or distribution
is attributable to circumstances present at the time of the manufacture, con-
struction, production, or purchase, the corporation shall, in the absence of
compelling facts to the contrary, be considered to have been so formed or
availed of."
" Braunstein v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd 374
U.S. 65 (1963).
" "The 'view' to such sale or distribution must exist at some time 'during
construction."' Id. at 951.
And the view of individual shareholders to construct after liquidation was
a "bad view" in Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 198):
"[T]hat petitioners, as the sole stockholders of the corporation, felt them-
selves in a position to make the agreements as individuals, knowing that their
controlled corporation could be counted upon to take whatever subsequent ac-
tion their commitments called for, is merely a further reason why the pro-
visions of section 117(m) must necessarily be invoked. If it were otherwise,
and if individuals could thus project the acts which would take place after
distribution and dissolution as though the corporation was in no sense a
participant, all of the provisions in question would be meaningless." Id.
at 541, quoting from Abbott v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 795, 807-08 (1957).
" Since Braunstein was decided after the dictum in Glickman v. Commis-
sioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958), which implied that the interpretation of
the regulations was narrower than that of the statute, it would seem that
the direct statement in the Braunstein case, which refers to the Glickinan
dictum, would place the Second Circuit in line with the Third Circuit and
the Tax Court that the proscribed view must exist during construction.
"' Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). The Third
Circuit doesn't imply, it categorically states that the view may not arise sub-
sequent to completion, Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703, 705 (3d Cir.
1960). "On the face of the statute Congress is here indicating a state of
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analysis of Burge v. Commissioner35 indicates that there was a
dictum indicating there might be a different application of the term
"availed of" there. The court stated that "it is not necessary that
the 'view' exist at the time the corporation is formed. It is suffi-
cient that it exist when the corporation is 'availed of'; and the cor-
poration was availed of here to dispose of all interest that the share-
holders had in the project .... -36
There was a minimum investment of one hundred dollars to
build an apartment building costing over a million and a half dol-
lars, issuance of Class A and Class B stock and the redemption of
Class B stock when the proceeds of the FHA loan exceeded the cost
of construction. The Fourth Circuit stated that the taxpayer's
testimony of a permanent investment was "very largely discredited,"
and that his testimony as to his intent was not sufficient to over-
come the Commissioner's presumption of correctness. The court
agreed with the Tax Court that the "view" was clearly established
by circumstances relating to the issuance and redemption of Class B
stock, and further stated:
[N]othing occurred prior to the sale of the Class A stock, less
than three months later, to warrant a holding that there had been
a change of "view" in the meantime .... [W]e think it clear
also that the liquidation of the Class B stock should be consid-
ered along with the sale of the Class A stock and that, when so
considered, there is no reason for holding that the corporation
was not "availed of" with the "view" required by the statute
with respect to both transactions."
In effect, the Fourth Circuit seemed to be saying that the requisite
"view" existed earlier, that the Tax Court had indicated there was
no change in view, and that both the redemption and the sales must
be considered together.
mind which must attend and gives significance to certain action. That ac-
tion, as specified in the statute, is not merely any formation or use of a cor-
poration but rather the formation or use of a corporation to construct or
produce property. The 'view' with which a corporation is used for a par-
ticular purpose must necessarily be a view entertained at the time of such
use. Thus, only by distorting disregard of the phrase 'for the * * * construc-
tion * * * of property' is it possible to reach the conclusion that the 'view to
* * * sale' contemplated by the statute can arise for the first time in connec-
tion with corporate activity after the work of construction is completed."
" Note 34 supra.
36 253 F.2d at 769.
'I Id. at 770.
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The court seemed also in its opinion to imply that the corpora-
tion was "availed of" when the shareholders decided to sell.88 And
yet, the Second Circuit in Farber v. Commissioner9 states that
"availed of" modifies for manufacture, construction or production,
implying that a corporation is not availed of for sale.4 The Tax
Court in the Burge case4 indicated that there was no testimony or
"other evidence to the fact that the petitioner and other stockholders,
at the time of the formation of the corporation, did not intend to
cause the corporation to redeem the Class B stock out of any avail-
able cash resulting from the loan in excess of the cost of the im-
provements."42 It then concluded that the petitioner had failed to
overcome the Commissioner's presumption of correctness. The
statement in the Burge case by the Fourth Circuit that it is sufficient
that the view exist when the corporation is availed of must be read
in the light of its peculiar facts where there was evidently no change
in view from that during construction. The provision of the statute
may exist merely to overcome the argument of a taxpayer who
utilizes (avails himself of) an existing corporation instead of form-
ing a new corporation
III. SUBSTANTIAL PART OF INCOME
Section 341 also requires that the view must be to effecting a
sale, exchange or distribution prior to the receipt of a substantial
part of the taxable income to be derived from the property which
has been constructed, manufactured, produced or purchased. Prob-
ably the most basic disagreement in this area is whether the words
"prior to the realization of a substantial part" apply to the portion
of the estimated taxable income which has been realized at the time
of sale or to the portion of the taxable income which at that time
remains unrealized.48
", The Burge case is an oft cited case with quotations and yet the actual
decision was merely the affirmation that the view was present at the time
required by the statute. Other references to it should be accorded only the
weight of dicta, but greater weight seems to be evidenced.
'p312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963).
40 "The first requirement is that the corporation be formed or availed of
principally for the * * * construction * * * of property." Id. at 733.
" Raymond G. Burge, 28 T.C. 246 (1957).
I21d. at 262.
"When this section came into law, The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee in H.R. Rm. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1950), indicated its
purpose to be that of preventing an attempt to convert ordinary income into
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Under the erroneous impression that the Tax Court had con-
strued the statute to refer to the portion of income remaining un-
realized at time of sale or exchange, the Third Circuit in Abbott v.
Commissioner44 applied this same harsh test. As so interpreted, the
statute condemns as collapsible the corporation which has already
realized a substantial part of the income derivable, if the portion of
income not yet realized also bulks large enough to be considered as
"substantial." In short, under the Abbott theory it is recognized
that there may be two or more substantial parts, and if even one of
them remains unrealized then the penalties of section 341 are called
into play.
The Internal Revenue Service still contends that as long as there
is a substantial portion of the taxable income unrealized, the cor-
poration can be held collapsible. Assuming the Service to be cor-
rect in its approach, a corporation could receive seventy or eighty
per cent of its taxable income to be derived from a project and still
be held to be collapsible. The Service, though, reports that it will
continue to follow the rule in the Abbott case.45
However, the Tax Court46 in no uncertain terms let the Third
long-term capital gain by use of a temporary corporation. The committee
was closing the loophole where the corporation was liquidated prior to the
realization by it of any income therefrom.
Compare § 1.341-5(d), Example 4, of the regulations covering a corpora-
tion producing and licensing motion pictures. The corporation had received
500,000 dollars from completed motion pictures between the date of material
completion of the last picture and the date of sale. The fair market value of
this last picture exceeded its cost by 50,000 dollars. The regulation states
that since the amount of the unrealized income from the property is not sub-
stantial in relation to the amount of income realized, the corporation is not
collapsible.
"258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958). "The real question posed by the statute,
however, is not whether a substantial part of the total profit was realized
prior to dissolution, but rather, whether that part of the total profit realized
after dissolution was substantial. This was the test correctly applied by the
Tax Court in making its finding that the dissolution took place before a sub-
stantial part (nearly 90 per cent) of the total profit was realized." Id. at
542.
Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. BuLL. 321.
'James B. Kelley, 32 T.C. 135 (1959), aff'd, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.
1961):
"With all due deference to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
we were not aware that we made the finding and applied the test referred
to in the above quotation. The matter being now squarely before us, it
is our opinion that the question posed by the statute is, to quote the statute
itself, whether there was "a view to-(i) the sale * * * of stock by * * *
shareholders * * * prior to the realization by the corporation * * * construct-
ing * ** or purchasing the property of a substantial part of the net income
1964]
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Circuit know that it had erroneously interpreted what the Tax
Court had held in the Abbott decision and then proceeded to apply
the test accepted by most legal commentators-that "substantial"
refers to the portion of the income already realized at the time of
the sale or exchange.
4 7
Had Congress intended that there must remain only an insub-
stantial part of the taxable income it, no doubt, would have required
that "substantially all" of the taxable income to be derived from the
property must have been received prior to the sale. All that Con-
gress required was that to be collapsible a corporation must have
just been "formed or availed of... with a view to-(A) the sale
... before the realization.., of a substantial part.... ." A literal
interpretation of this part of the statute could mean that actual reali-
zation or non-realization of income has nothing to do with the
determination of the collapsible status. The courts could hold, for
example, that even though only three per cent of the taxable income
had been received and all of the other factors were present except
that time of receipt of income was never considered in the forma-
tion of the view to sale, the corporation was still not collapsible.
Actually, what the courts seemed to have been doing is looking
at the actual receipt of taxable income and, though not alluding to
the type of intent involved, considering that the expression of in-
to be derived from such property .... Put more succinctly, it is our opinion
that the question to be decided is whether the realized income is a substantial
part of the net income to be derived from the property and not whether the
unrealized income is a substantial part of such net income .... It is our
further opinion that there may be two (or more) substantial parts of a
whole, and therefore a finding that the unrealized part of such net income is
substantial does not preclude a finding that the realized part of such net in-
come is substantial." Id. at 149-50.
'
7 See Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961), where the
argument was made that the corporation received, after the distribution, over
fifty per cent of the income, and the court refused to accept it.
"Unfortunately for the petitioners, the statute focuses on the timing of
the transactions: the corporation is collapsible, if the exchange of stock oc-
curs 'prior to the realization'; the corporation must realize a 'substantial
part of its net income' before the stockholders sell or exchange their stock.
The collapsibility of the corpgration is determined, therefore, when the share-
holders first sell or exchange stock in the corporation. Since the test is
embodied in the definition of 'collapsible corporation' and the statute applies
indiscriminately to any gain from the sale or exchange of stock in a col-
lapsible corporation, if an initial liquidating distribution falls within the
statute all subsequent distributions also come within the ambit of the statute
irrespective of whether at the time of a later distribution the corporation has
earned a substantial part of its income." Id. at 798.
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tent as evidenced by the receipt of income was such that if a sub-
stantial part of the taxable income had been realized prior to sale,
there would be no collapsibility. It would, indeed, be difficult to
hold that a corporation was collapsible after receipt of sixty per cent
of its taxable income to be derived from constructed property on the
ground that the view to sale was formed with the intent to sell prior
to realization of the income, even though the intent was not carried
out.
The statute specifically states that the consideration of income
involves the "realization by the corporation" of the substantial
part of the income.
What is the substantial part of income? The District Court for
the northern district of Alabama has held 51.37 per cent of the esti-
mated income to be a substantial part.4" The Fifth Circuit has
held 331/3 per cent to be substantial 9 while 17 per cent is not.50 The
" Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957). Of
3,495 trailers in the original contract, 1,795 had been sold and 1,700 re-
mained when the stock was sold. Although the original basis of the court's
decision that there was no collapsibility was that the executory contract was
a capital asset, it stated a second ground, that more than fifty per cent of
the net income already realized constituted a "substantial part." At the same
time it suggested that Congress might amend the law to fix an arbitrary
percentage.
' Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961), affirming 32
T.C. 135 (1959). The taxpayers had planned to obtain an FHA loan but
failed, and also could not obtain private financing. After selling about one-
third of the improved property, five of seven shareholders sold their stock
to the corporation. A few months later, the taxpayers sold their stock in the
corporation. Rejecting again the government's contention that "substantial"
refers to the unrealized, not the realized, part of the net income, the court
concluded that one-third of the net income constituted a substantial part.
judge Rives' dissent was not concerned with percentages. He agreed with
the Commissioner that the unrealized part was that which was determinable.
In Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. Buu.. 321, the Commissioner not only
disagreed with the decision, he served notice that he would continue to ad-
here to the position that "substantial" refers to the unrealized income stat-
ing: "The Internal Revenue Service will not follow the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Commissioner v.
James B. Kelley ....
"The Service's position is that a corporation is collapsible under section
117(m) (2) (A) of the 1939 Code and section 341(b) (1) (A) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 if prior to the sale of the stock by the shareholders
there remains a substantial part of the net income yet to be derived from the
property.
"The Service contended in the Kelley case since a substantial amount
(two-thirds) of the net income remained to be derived prior to the sale of
stock, the corporation was collapsible. However, the court held that the
phrase 'substantial part' appearing in section 117(m) (2) (A) of the 1939
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Tax Court has found that 23 per cent is substantial" while 10 per
cent is not.
52
"Substantial," though, cannot be separated from its context-
Code, which defines a collapsible corporation, has reference to that part of
the total anticipated net income to be derived from the property which had
already been realized at the time of the stock sale, and since one-third of the
income realized by the corporation prior to the sale of the stock is a sub-
stantial part of the total net income to be derived from the property, the
corporation was not collapsible.
"Although review by the Supreme Court of the United States was not
requested in the Kelley case, the decision will not be followed as a precedent
in the disposition of similar cases, and the Internal Revenue Service position
will be maintained pending further clarification of the issue." Ibid.
In the Tax Court, 32 T.C. at 154, Judge Opper had dissented, with fourjudges joining him. He asserts that it is the "view" which governs and that
basing decisions on actual receipt of income is an "open invitation to cal-
culated schemes of avoidance," and further that section 341 now has a loop-
hole of the size of two-thirds of the gain.
"°Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1961). This case was
decided just after Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961),
in the same circuit and indicated that no arbitrary percentage could be set.
"In contrast to a fixed relative term, such as twenty per cent, expressing
the same proportional relationship in every context, 'substantial' may indi-
cate a certain proportion in one instance, a different proportion in another.
To ascertain its meaning in any particular context one must examine the
frame of reference and the purpose intended by use of the term." Id. at 797.
Further removing the "view" from the "realization of income," the
court stated, "by its terms, however, it does not apply if the owners hold
their stock until after a 'substantial' part of the corporation's income has
been realized. This restriction enables taxpayers to continue to bring a con-
siderable part of the corporation's ordinary income through the hole in the
fence to the greener pasture of capital gains treatment." Ibid.
" E. J. Zongker, 39 T.C. No. 107 (March 26, 1963). The Tax Court
may in this case have given its first indication of a rule of thumb which it
might apply absent special influencing factors. "No case is cited, and we
find none, where more than 20 per cent of total net profits has been held
insubstantial." Id. at 8. Whether or not it will use this dictum will remain
to be seen. Peel, Recent Collapsible Developments: Inadvertent Collapsi-
bility, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAx 851 (1962), has a good discussion of
"substantial." As a sidelight it could well be noted that in the Zongker
case the facts showed approximately 34 per cent received prior to the sale
but the Tax Court went further and assumed a different price so that only
23 per cent of the total income had been received prior to the sale.
" Max N. Tobias, 40 T.C. 84 (1963). The taxpayer's corporation, Fu-
ture, had realized 45,000 dollars in rentals when an option was exercised by
Magnolia. Under the 10-year lease with Magnolia it would have realized
476,250 dollars in rentals. The court found that it was reasonable to expect
that Future would have realized at least that amount from the real estate
through rentals, and held that the amount of realized income at the time of
the sale was not substantial so as to take the transaction outside the scope
of section 341(b) (1) (A), comparing Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 795




a substantial part is what is to be considered. Necessarily involved
is a determination of the total taxable income to be received from the
property.13 In the usual factual situation, especially those involving
rental real property, the total income may be reasonably predictable,
but other "taxable income" determinations will be very different.
Instead, because of the ever-changing nature of our lives, a total
pure income figure should be discounted, e.g., for the probability
of population shifts, competition, technological improvements which
make present property obsolete and key personnel losses.
IV. THE "AVAILED OF" AREA
There has been some difference of opinion on the grammatical
structure of the collapsible corporation definition as to whether
"principally" modifies "for the manufacture, construction or pro-
duction of property" or whether it modifies "for the holding of stock
in a corporation so formed or availed of."54 Opposite views also
exist as to whether "availed of" modifies "for the manufacture, con-
struction or production of property" or whether it modifies "the
" The Tax Court in James B. Kelley, 32 T.C. 135 (1959), stated its
position: "It is obvious that in many cases the amount of 'the whole of the
net income which may be reasonably anticipated to be derived from such
property' must be an approximation. In the instant cases the approximate
can be close to the absolute amount since the property was liquidated within
3 years subsequent to the sale of the stock. However, there must still be
some approximation since we are concerned not with gross receipts but with
net profits. It would not, in our opinion, be within the legislative intent of
the statute for 'the whole of the net income which may be reasonably antici-
pated to be derived from such property' to be measured by two different
bases or two different accounting systems. Stated another way, it is our
opinion that 'the whole of the net income which may be reasonably antici-
pated' must be approximated as of the date of the sale or exchange of the
corporation's stock on the assumption that the cost basis and accounting
method used by the corporation in measuring its net income from the prop-
erty at that time will remain static." Id. at 151.
This clear statement should overcome, in that court at least, any objection
by the Commissioner that in a specific case it is impossible to estimate the
total income to be derived, and thus impossible to know what constitutes a
"substantial" part. The approximation must be done in order for the
statute itself to have meaning.
Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 174 approves an equitable result
in not taxing as ordinary income to the shareholders of a liquidating hold-
ing company the gain caused by the holding company's sale of its collapsible
subsidiary where it reported its income under section 341.
atWeil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805 (2d. Cir. 1958), should have
settled the question, holding that it modifies "for the manufacture," for it
was restated in the same circuit in Mintz v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 554
(2d Cir. 1960).
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sale or exchange of stock.., or a distribution .... ,5" Looking first
to "formed or availed of," we immediately are impressed that the
breadth of this provision means that the corporation need not be
newly-formed. An old corporation may be "availed of" for the pur-
poses with the proscribed view, thus making capital gains taxable
as ordinary income. 6 In Farber v. Commissioner 7 decided in Jan-
uary, 1963, the Second Circuit found that "formed or availed of"
modified the construction phrase and eliminated any further con-
sideration of the position that a corporation could be formed or
availed of for other than manufacture, construction, production or
purchase. The court in Farber clearly established its position, stat-
ing that "we have no doubt that Eagle Mount was 'availed of prin-
cipally for.., construction,' in the light of the provision of § 117 (m)
(2) (B),"s after indicating that the first requirement of a collapsible
corporation is that it be "formed or availed of principally for the
*. construction ... of property."
59
Evidently one of the reasons that the Burge case of the Fourth
Circuit has been cited so much is that it seemed to hold that "the
availing" of the corporation need not be for manufacture, construc-
tion, production or purchase, but that it could be availing for sale.
The court stated: "And the corporation was availed of here to dis-
pose of all interests that the shareholders had in the project by sale
or exchange of stock before it had realized any substantial part of
the net income to be derived from the property.""0
If the Second Circuit is correct in Farber, the dictum in the
Burge case must be an unwarranted extension of "availed of" to a
subparagraph in section 341 dealing only with the kind of "view"
the shareholders must have. However, if we ignore that there had
been no "change of view" since completion of construction, we would
be forced to say that the Burge case implies that "availed of" modi-
fies "sale or exchange" rather than the construction phrase. If that
is what the Fourth Circuit intended, it would in the opinion of this
writer be wrong. If the Fourth Circuit's statement is that the cor-
" See Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). The Com-
missioner continues to urge that "availed of" can modify "sale."
H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1950).
67312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1963).
"Id. at 734.
"Id. at 733.
SBurgev. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1958).
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poration was availed of (for construction in order) to dispose of a
shareholder's interest by sale or exchange before a realization of sub-
stantial part of the taxable income, then the Burge-holding is cor-
rect. Any other interpretation of the Burge case places it in direct
conflict with the Tax Court and the other Circuits6' which have
released decisions since that date; and with the Regulations, which
simply state that the view to sale or exchange must exist at some
time during construction.62 For example, a corporation could be
formed to build an office building with the idea of obtaining long-
term tenants. The building could be completed on March 1, 1964,
and national company tenants secured, all with twenty-year leases.
After two years, the sole owner of the corporation (who also man-
ages it) could become ill and remain sick for eight months, leaving
the management to someone else. At that time, with doctor's advice
that he would be permanently disabled and unable to run the build-
ing himself, and discovering that his interim building management
was very poor, he could decide to sell. At most he would have re-
ceived three-twentieths of the expected income from the building and
perhaps the percentage would be even less than that since the build-
ing's life is considered longer. At this point he has made a decision
to sell the corporation. He has decided to dispose of the corporation
and the facts show that the part of the income received (three-
twentieths) is probably not substantial. Under the supposed Burge
theory, with the view to selling arising at the time of the "availing,"
it would be possible to have a collapsible corporation rather than a
capital gains sale.
" In Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959) the Tax Court
was affirmed in its conclusion that the view was present at the time the
corporations were organized. The Fifth Circuit placed Burge and Glickman
(later called a dictum by the Second Circuit in Braunstein) together in
overlooking part of the statutory language: "We think we need not go as
far as the courts did in the two decided cases in construing the language
'availed of principally for the construction of property with a view to a
distribution to shareholders.' The two opinions adopted the theory that if
the intention and purpose of making a distribution to shareholders was
formulated and followed by such actual distribution resulting in gain prior
to the realization of a substantial part of the income from the property, then
the corporation was 'availed of' for the 'proscribed purpose.' While not
disagreeing with this construction of the statute, we recognize that it seems
to overlook the requirement by the statute that the corporation must be
availed of for construction of property with a view to a distribution, etc."
Id. at 620.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955).
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Even the Tax Court in Maxwell Temkin 8 may have fallen into
the trap of construing "availed of" as modifying something other
than the construction phrase stating: "In the light of Burge v. Com-
missioner... and Sidney v. Commissioner ... it makes no differ-
ence whether it was so 'availed of' before or after construction of
the apartment project was completed."' 4 If "availed of" must modi-
fy the construction phrase, then it does make a difference and the
Burge dictum is an improper interpretation of this complicated
statutory section.
Removing "availed of" from its immediately surrounding terms
of subsection (b) of section 341 would broaden the entire field of
applicability of the section. This section originally enacted be-
cause of a "bad view" formed at the time of or during the manu-
facture, construction or production of property would now be ex-
tended to the beginning of a view to convert ordinary income into
capital gains subsequent to the time of completion of construction.
No sale of stock of a corporation and no liquidation of a corporation
within three years after completion would be safe if the decision to
sell were based on a consideration of the time of receipt of income.
These extensions of the statute are improper and, in the opinion of
the writer, the attempted extension of the section is in many factual
situations overzealous action. It would be hoped that the normal
business and investment transactions, absent such facts as were
present in the Burge case, would not be attacked on the basis of the
arising of a "bad view" only at the time of sale, thus considering the
corporation as having been "availed of" for sale.
The entire history of the litigation under section 341 indicates
an attempt on the part of the Internal Revenue Service to apply
only objective standards where Congress clearly specified subjective
considerations.
V. LIMITATIONS
Exclusive of subsection (e) which must be handled separately
due to the fact it was introduced to the law in 1958 as an inde-
pendent body of exceptions, there are other limitations on the ap-
plicability of section 341. When the statute was first passed by Con-
gress, it was realized that there should be some predetermined




limitations so that every business which had some appreciation and
thus profit from property which had been manufactured, constructed
or produced would not be hit with ordinary income. Three excep-
tions were place into the statute originally in what is now section
341(d).
The first limitation was that a shareholder owning ten per cent
or less of the company was excluded from the operation of the
section. The ten per cent ownership test was amended and now is a
"more than five per cent in value of the outstanding stock of the
corporation" test.6 5 The statute reads that the provisions shall not
apply
unless, at any time after the commencement of the manufacture,
construction or production of the property, or at the time of the
purchase of the property described in subsection (b) (3) or at any
time thereafter, such shareholder... owned (or was considered as
owning) more than 5 percent in value of the outstanding stock of
the corporation or ... owned stock which was considered as owned
at such time by another shareholder who then owned... more
than five per cent .... 66
The purpose, of course, of this exception is to "insure
that the provision will only be applicable to a shareholder who by
virtue of his stock ownership can be presumed to be an interested
party to the project whether at the time of its organization or at
some intermediate date."67 Normally a shareholder owning five per
cent or less will have little interest in and almost certainly no control
over the policies of the corporation, and yet fixing an arbitrary per-
centage below which a shareholder will not be considered as owning
shares in a collapsible corporation gives rise to claims that all above
that are burdened with the attitudes of those who control the cor-
'" INT. R-v. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d) (1). Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(b)
(1955), states: "Stock Ownership Rules. (1) This section shall apply in
the case of gain realized by a shareholder upon his stock in a collapsible
corporation only if the shareholder, at any time after the actual commence-
ment of the manufacture, construction, or production of the property, or at
any time of the purchase of the property described in section 341(b) (3) or
at any time thereafter, (i) owned, or was considered as owning, more than
5 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation, or (ii) owned
stock which was considered as owned at such time by another shareholder
who then owned, or was considered as owning, more than 5 percent in value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation."
'
8 I T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (d) (1).
o7 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1950).
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poration. Indeed the Regulations so declare. 8 The committee re-
ports give no reason for changing the ten per cent to five per cent,
especially since special attribution rules are in effect. Thus, twenty
individuals owning five per cent of the outstanding stock each and not
under the attribution rules could construct property with the pro-
scribed view fitting under all of the applicable rules of section 341
and still end up with capital gain because of the limitation. In fact,
twelve individuals owning five per cent each could form a corpora-
tion to construct property having the proscribed view and sell. A
forty per cent interest of one individual could then be held by one
who entered the deal merely for investment purposes and with no
proscribed view. The twelve individuals would receive capital gains
treatment with the "clean" shareholder, under the theory of the
Regulations, being saddled with the proscribed view of the majority
stock and paying ordinary income tax.
A shareholder must also be careful if his ownership percentage
is increased by the redemption by the corporation. The corpora-
tion's redemption of all the stock of a one per cent shareholder would
make a former five per cent shareholder then own a percentage in-
terest in the corporation greater than five per cent and his prior
exclusion under this subsection could be lost with his gain taxable
as ordinary income. The section specifically provides that "at any
time" after the commencement of manufacture, construction or pro-
duction if the shareholder owns more than five per cent, he does not
come within the limitations.
The extension by the Regulations of the majority shareholder's
"view" to a more-than-five per cent minority shareholder seems to
be an erroneous extension of the statutory language. Congress did
away with the small shareholder cases in fixing the five per cent
limitation, but it did not say that for all minority shareholders who
" Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (2) (1955), provides: "This requirement is
satisfied in any case in which such action was contemplated by those persons
in a position to determine the policies of the corporation, whether by reason
of their owning a majority of the voting stock of the corporation or other-
wise. The requirement is satisfied whether such action was contemplated,
unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized possibility. If the corpora-
tion was so formed or availed of, it is immaterial that a particular share-
holder was not a shareholder at the time of the manufacture, construction,
production, or purchase of the property, or if a shareholder at such time,
did not share in such view. Any gain of such a shareholder on his stock
in the corporation shall be treated in the same manner as of a shareholder
who did share in such view .... "
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owned over five per cent of the stock the provisions requiring the
"view" were inapplicable. It raises the question of whether a cor-
poration when formed or availed of for construction with a pro-
scribed view by majority shareholders can be a collapsible corpora-
tion as to those shareholders and not be a collapsible corporation
as to minority shareholders who held no "bad" view.
Congress has specifically set up rules for attribution of stock
ownership, using section 544(a) in one instance69 and section 267 (c)
in another,70 but nowhere does Congress require attribution of a
mental attitude from controlling shareholders to minority share-
holders. In those cases where the question could have arisen, the
courts found that the "view" was shared by all, thus eliminating the
necessity of facing the attribution of view where no clear statutory
authority therefor exists.
Section 341 (d) (2) provides another exception to the applica-
tion of the section. 71 The statute does not apply unless more than
seventy per cent of the gain on the sale or exchange of stock is
attributable to "the property so manufactured, constructed, pro-
duced or purchased."72 Under this exception, the basic point for
determination is the value of the property constructed or produced.
The gain must be attributable to the property "so" manufactured,
constructed, produced or purchased. Thus, gain recognized during
a taxable year with respect to the stock which is not attributable to
the property, but is attributable to other assets of the corporation
(for example, stock which has a low basis and a high market value)
will remove the sale from section 341, if that other gain is thirty
per cent or more of the total.
The Regulations provide: "Where, for example, a corporation
owns a tract of land and the development of one-half of the tract
increases the value of the other half, the gain attributable to the de-
veloped half of the tract includes the increase in the value of the
"INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 341 (d).
,oINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341 (e) (8).7'And Treas. Reg § 1.341-4(c) (1955), states when none of the gain is
subject to this section: "Seventy-percent rule. (1) This section shall apply
to the gain recognized during a taxable year upon the stock in a collapsible
corporation only if more than 70 percent of such gain is attributable to the
property referred to in section 341(b) (1). If more than 70 percent of such
gain is so attributable, then all of such gain is subject to this section, and,
if 70 percent or less of such gain is so attributable, then none of such gain
is subject to this section."
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d) (2).
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
other half. '73 Failure to appreciate this point of the Regulations
could snare a taxpayer who otherwise figures that he has removed
himself from the application of this section.
In the determination of fair market value of the total assets
of a corporation for the purpose of determining the fifty per cent
presumption,74 stock in any other corporation is not taken into ac-
count. However, in looking at the limitations on the application of
section 341 geared to seventy per cent of the gain, no such elimina-
tion is required. Thus, if all of the "bad" aspects are present prior
to a sale of stock by a controlling eighty per cent stockholder, can
that stockholder, by feeding into the corporation under section 351
some of his personal portfolio low-basis stock, thus have thirty-five
per cent of the subsequent gain on the sale of the stock in the cor-
poration attributable to other than property so manufactured, con-
structed, produced or purchased? If the controlling shareholder is
willing to pay a capital gains tax on the additional thirty-five per
cent of the gain in order to assure all of his gain on property con-
structed to be capital rather than ordinary income, he has stepped
up his basis on his personal portfolio stock and perhaps saved con-
siderable tax on the otherwise collapsible property.
But subparagraph (b) (2) (B) of section 341, by attributing to
the corporation the manufacture, construction, production or pur-
chase of property which it holds "having a basis determined, in whole
or in part, by reference to the cost of such property in the hands of
a person who manufactured, constructed, produced or purchased the
property," 75 attempts to prevent tax-free transfers to the corporation
of property, which would, if produced, etc., by the corporation, fit
78Treas. Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (3) (1955).
'INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 341(c), not discussed in this article since
the presumption is of little value to the Commissioner. The applicable Regu-
lation under that subsection is Treas. Reg. § 1.341-3 (1955) : "Presumptionmw
-(a) Unless shown to the contrary, a corporation shall be considered to be
a collapsible corporation if at the time of the transactions described in§ 1.341-1 the fair market value of the section 341 assets held by it consti-
tutes 50 percent or more of the fair market value of its total assets and the
fair market value of the section 341 assets is 120 percent or more of the ad-justed basis of such assets. In determining the fair market value of the
total assets, cash, obligations which are capital assets in the hands of the
corporation, governmental obligations, and stock in any other corporation
shall not be taken into consideration. The failure of a corporation to meet
the requirements of this paragraph, shall not give rise to the presumption that
the corporation was not a collapsible corporation."
' INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 341(b) (2) (B).
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the collapsible definition, from removing the corporation from the ap-
plication of the section. Indeed, Regulations section 1.341-2 (a) (5)
specifically illustrates a transfer under a section 351 tax-free in-
corporation of property constructed by an individual and declares the
property to be constructed by the corporation.76
This provision is clear enough except when we are discussing
the purchase of property. The attribution of the individual's action
is "For purposes of paragraph (1),'1 and paragraph (1) in its
definition of collapsible corporation applies to the purchase only of
property which is a section 341 asset. Thus, even though the pur-
chase of property is attributed to the corporation, it is not property
which is a section 341 asset if it is stock in another corporation,
say of IBM or General Motors.
The seventy per cent rule applies only to property referred to, in
section 341 (b) (1) (the definition paragraph) and does not include
property purchased which is not a "section 341 asset." Although
it might be urged that the term "property" in Section 341 (b) (2) (B)
applies to any property, after following the references, it seems clear
that the term, when used with "purchased," must be limited to a
section 341 asset.
The third limitation in subsection (d) is that section 341 does
not apply to "gain realized after the expiration of 3 years following
the completion of such manufacture, construction, production, or
purchase." ' The beauty of this exception is that the bad view can
be present, there can be a formation or an availing of a corporation,
there can be a sale prior to the realization of substantial income and,
" Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (5) (1955): "Under subdivision (ii) of this
subparagraph, for example, if an individual were to transfer property con-
structed by him to a corporation in exchange for all of the capital stock of
such corporation, and such transfer qualifies under section 351, then the
corporation would be deemed to have constructed the property, since the
basis of the property in the hands of the corporation would, under section
362 be determined by reference to the basis of the property in the hands of
the individual."
In Erwin Gerber, 32 T.C. 1199 (1959), the taxpayer contended that the
increase in the value of the land was more than 30 per cent separate from
the apartment building; but the court found a lower land value and brought
the total below the 30 per cent, and then declared that some part, undeter-
mined in the case, of the land value increase was due to the apartment con-
structed. And Paul Brande, 35 T.C. 1158 (1961), failed in an attempt to
prove some of the appreciation in value preceded transfer of the property into
the corporation.
7 INT. REv. CoDE. OF 1954, § 341 (b) (2).
'
8 INT. IV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d) (3).
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yet, so long as the sale takes place and the gain is realized three years
after completion of construction, etc., the sale is removed from the
applicability of this section. There have been a few cases which have
involved the determination of when construction is complete,"0 the
Internal Revenue Service naturally contending that construction is
not complete until, in effect, the last blade of grass which was
planted for the landscaping has grown to a height of two inches.
This is, of course, absurd; and, yet, the Service has urged conclusions
almost as erroneous in trying to extend the period of construction
so that its completion will be within the three-year period prior to
the sale of the stock."0 Just as the Service would benefit from suc-
cessful attempts to "commence construction" almost at the moment
the idea of building is conceived in the mind of the taxpayer, so it
will obtain more revenue if it extends the construction period to the
latest possible date.oa
VI. SUBSECTION (E)
In 1958, Congress became concerned about the terms of the
existing law relating to collapsible corporations and the interpreta-
" E.g., Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958). Ninety-
nine per cent completion was insufficient where all the work on the contract
was not complete. In Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 178, the Com-
missioner held that a zoning petition granted in 1952, but litigated until
1954 by objectors, constituted construction and was completed on date zoning
was declared final.
'In Rev. Rul. 63-114, 1963 INT. Riv. BULL. No. 24, at 9, the Commis-
sioner did concede that after all work required in the plans and specifications
was completed and the building totally occupied, minor alterations and cor-
rections which "did not increase the area available for rentals and did not
change the character of the structure" and "did not appreciably increase the
fair market value of the structure or the net income that could be realized
from the building" did not constitute continuance of construction. This
is hardly a concession since it implies that had a change enabled the tax-
payer to charge one tenant a slightly higher rent by giving him more area
for rental, it conceivably could have been construction.
'"The Government's contention of early commencement of construction
has included contracts with the city to have utilities installed, Abbott v.
Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958); retention of an architect pay-
ing 300 dollars on account, and applying to the city for water and sewer,
J. Farber, 36 T.C. 1142 (1960), aff'd, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1961); pur-
chase of land, hiring of mortgage broker and architect and obtaining fi-
nancial commitment, Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959); and re-
zoning along with hiring an architect, Sproul Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844
(1962). But see Vernon W. McPherson, 21 T.C.M. 583 (1962), where




tions which had been placed on that section by the courts, feeling that
"they have exactly the opposite effect from that intended-instead
of preventing the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain,
they may instead convert what would otherwise be capital gain into
ordinary income.8' For that reason, and because of the difficulty of
determining the subjective intent, Congress amended the law by add-
ing subsection (e) to section 341. Some of the difficulty in creating
an objective standard to replace one of subjective intent is evident
by the length and detail of the four exceptions enacted in subsection
(e). This exception subsection is four pages long, twice as long as
the entire original section 341, and critical analyses of the subsection
by many writers declare it to have absurd and inconsistent features,
to be a maze of interrelated subparts and generally more complicated
than the original section, itself called "a briar patch of subjective
tests, indefinite standards, unresolved ambiguities, statutory pre-
sumptions and objective limitations."8' 2 Five years have elapsed
since the subsection was enacted on September 2, 1958, applicable
to years beginning after December 31, 1957 (but only with respect
to sales, exchanges and distributions after the date of enactment)
and there is still not even a proposed regulation for subsection (e).
The Senate Finance Committee was particularly concerned with
the determination of the subjective intent in all of the various situa-
tions in this area.8 3 The Committee was explicit, when adopting
objective tests to remove the necessity in many instances of deter-
mination of subjective intent and also to eliminate the impediments
to legitimate business transactions, in its declarations that the en-
actment of these exceptions should not create any inference that the
failure of a corporation with respect to any of its shareholders to
meet these requirements in subsection (e) would in any way in-
fluence basic determination of collapsibility under the rest of section
:.S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1958).
82 Modrall, Collapsible Corporations and Subsection (e), 37 TAXES 895,
948 (1959).
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1958): "Your committee
believes that this amendment is desirable in order to avoid determinations of
subjective intent in the situations described in this amendment and also to
avoid the possibility in this area of the conversion of capital gain income
into ordinary income. Furthermore, it is believed that this amendment will
have the effect of removing some of the impediments that presently exist in
the case of legitimate business transactions without permitting the tax avoid-
ance which the collapsible corporation provisions are intended to prevent."
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341.84 It seems clear that the Committee attempted to list some of
the instances in which the subjective determination would be re-
moved but did not attempt to write an all-inclusive list.
The basic test which must be met to remove the corporation from
the "collapsible" status under subsection (e) is that the net un-
realized appreciation on the "ordinary income" assets of the corpora-
tion does not exceed fifteen- per cent of the net worth of the corpora-
tion. What are "ordinary income" -assets of -a corporation? The
Senate Finance Committee has clearly indicated that these are the
assets of the corporation which, if sold at a gain, would result in
the imposition of an ordinary income tax on the corporation.8"
Actually the unrealized appreciation on the ordinary income assets
must be determined at the same time one of the four exceptions is
applied.
There is a new term in subsection (e) which gears all determina-
tions thereunder to "subsection (e) assets" rather than "section 341
assets." The determination of the figures which will not "exceed
an amount equal to fifteen per cent of the net worth of the corpora-
tion" is different in the four ,exceptions. Injection of a, new
definition of assets makes the applicability of the subsection as to
a particular asset of the company different from the application of
section 341 as a whole. To see the difference we need to look at the
new definition of subsection (e) assets and the established definition
of section 341 assets."'
", Id. at 34: "The amendments contained in section 22 to the collapsible
corporation provisions are not for the purpose of causing any corporation
to be regarded as a collapsible corporation. Your committee recognizes that
there may be legitimate corporate enterprises that will be unable to meet the
terms of the limited statutory exceptions contained in section 22. Your com-
mittee does net believe that any inference should be drawn from the failure
of any corporation, or the failure of any corporation with respect to any
of its shareholders, to meet the requirements for any or all of the new
statutory exceptions to the application of the collapsible corporation pro-
visions. Accordingly, it is expressly provided that in determining whether
any corporation is a collapsible corporation within the meaning of section
341(b) of the 1954 Code, the fact that such corporation, or such corpora-
tion with respect to any of its shareholders, does not meet the requirements
of any of the new rules shall not be taken into account, and such determina-
tion shall be made as if such rules had not been enacted."
'DId. at 33.
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b)(3): "SEcTioN 341 Ass~zs.-
For purposes of this section, -the term "section 341 assets" means property
held for a period of less than 3 years which is--
(A) stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind
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Subsection (e) assets are defined generally as:
(1) Property which in whole or in part does not produce capital
gain or loss on its sale;
(2) Property used in the trade or business where unrealized
depreciation exceeds unrealized appreciation;
(3) Property used in the trade or business which, if it were
held by a shareholder who owns more than twenty per cent of the
stock of the corporation, would be property which would not pro-
duce capital gain or loss on its sale but only if unrealized apprecia-
tion on all such property exceeds unrealized depreciation;
(4) A copyright, literary, musical or artistic composition or
similar property or any interest in such property, if the property was
created by the personal efforts of a more than five per cent stock-
holder.
A subsection (e) asset may include a capital asset; section 341
assets may not include a capital asset. The definition of a subsection
(e) asset as well as the exceptions add a new concept to prevent
dealers from otherwise receiving the benefits intended for investors
under the 1958 exceptions. A person who owns more than twenty
per cent, after attribution, and who is a "dealer" in any class of
property held by the corporation is thus the cause of adding all of
that class of the corporation's assets to the "ordinary income" class
even though, without the dealer as a shareholder, the property would
be a capital asset and productive of capital gain or loss. The
inequity of this situation is that the taxable status of one individual
shareholder thus may cause the exception under subsection (e) to be
inapplicable with the result that, no exception being available, the
determination reverts to the general parts of section 341. For ex-
ample, a dealer owning twenty-one per cent of a corporation may
hurt the other seventy-nine per cent by having a certain class of asset
which would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on
hand at the close of the taxable year;(B) property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of its trade or business;
(C) unrealized receivables or fees, except receivables from sales of
property other than property described in this paragraph; or(D) property described in section 1231(b) (without regard to any
holding period therein provided), except such property which is or has
been used in connection with the manufacture, construction, production,
or sale of property described in subparagraphs (A) or (B)."
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thus declared "ordinary income" rather than capital. This forces
shareholders of corporations to know in detail all of the activities
of all other shareholders of the corporation in order to be assured
that they would fall within the exceptions of subsection 341 (e).
Section 1231(b) property is a subsection (e) asset if the un-
realized depreciation exceeds unrealized appreciation. And, if un-
realized appreciation exceeds unrealized depreciation on all property
used in the trade or business, section 1231(b) property would be
included in the subsection (e) assets if it would be "ordinary in-
come" property in the hands of a more than twenty per cent share-
holder. There is neither rhyme nor reason for the difference in ap-
plication when there is an unrealized depreciation as against an un-
realized appreciation on property used in the trade or business. It
is just one of those results of attempting to cover too much under a
complicated exception rather than making a simple exception and
leaving it up to the courts to interpret congressional intent as ap-
plied to the particular facts at issue.
The determination of whether or not property is to be an "ordi-
nary income" asset is to be made "as if all property of the corpora-
tion had been sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction. '8 7
This provision is in line with another part of the subsection which
gears the net worth definition to the day of sale or exchange.
Whether applying this at the corporate level or at the shareholder
level to determine the extent of "ordinary income," it must be as if
all property were sold to one person in one transaction. 8
As stated earlier, the key to subsection (e) exceptions is that
the net unrealized appreciation of certain defined assets must not
exceed an amount equal to fifteen per cent of the net worth of the
corporation. The evident purpose of the use of this specific, if
arbitrary, fifteen per cent, rather than some other percentage, was
to eliminate relatively small amounts of potential ordinary income
from section 341, thus permitting a fifteen per cent loophole in the
law in order to obtain, in the stated exception areas, an objective
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (5) (A).88Ibid. "The determination as to whether property of the corporation
in the hands of the corporation is, or in the hands of a shareholder would be,
property gain from the sale or exchange of which would under any provision
in this chapter be considered in whole or in part as gain from the sale or
exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property described
in section 1231(b) shall be made as if all property of the corporation had
been sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction."
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test. Thus, irrespective of who is and who is not, a dealer, so long
as the unrealized appreciation on the assets of the corporation (and
other assets which figure into the formulae) does not exceed fifteen
per cent of the net worth, every stockholder fitting into one of the
exceptions is home free. Everybody is home free at the corporate
level. Some tests still remain at the shareholder level. s9
so The test applicable to most situations is that involving sales or ex-
changes:
"(e) ExcEPTIONs To APPLICATION OF SEcTIO.-
(1) SALES op. EXCHANGES OF SToc.-For purposes of subsection
(a) (1), a corporation shall not be considered to be a collapsible corporation
with respect to any sale or exchange of stock of the corporation by a share-
holder, if, at the time of such sale or exchange, the sum of-
(A) the net unrealized appreciation in subsection (e) assets of the
corporation (as defined in paragraph (5) (A)), plus
(B) if the shareholder owns more than 5 percent in value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation, the net unrealized appreciation in
assets of the corporation (other than assets described in subparagraph
(A)) which would be subsection (e) assets under clauses (i) and (iii)
of paragraph (5) (A) if the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in
value of such stock, plus
(C) if the shareholder owns more than 20 percent in value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation and owns, or at any time during
the preceding 3-year period owned, more than 20 percent in value of the
outstanding stock of any other corporation more than 70 percent in value
of the assets of which are, or were at any time during which such share-
holder owned during such 3-year period more than 20 percent in value
of the outstanding stock, assets similar or related in service or use to
assets comprising more than 70 percent in value of the assets of the
corporation, the net unrealized appreciation in assets of the corporation
(other than assets described in subparagraph (A)) which would be sub-
section (e) assets under clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (5) (A) if
the determination whether the property, in the hands of such shareholder,
would be property gain from the sale or exchange of which would under
any provision of this chapter be considered in whole or in part as gain
from the sale or exchange or property which is neither a capital asset
nor property described in section 1231(b), were made-
(i) by treating any sale or exchange by such shareholder of stock
in such other corporation within the preceding 3-year period (but only
if at the time of such sale or exchange the shareholder owned more
than 20 percent in value of the outstanding stock in such other cor-
poration) as a sale or exchange by such shareholder of his propor-
tionate share of the assets of such other corporation, and
(ii) by treating any sale or exchange of property by such other
corporation within such 3-year period (but only if at the time of such
sale or exchange the shareholder owned more than 20 percent in
value of the outstanding stock in such other corporation), gain or loss
on which was not recognized to such other corporation under section
337(a), as a sale or exchange by such shareholder of his proportionate
share of the property sold or exchanged,
does not exceed an amount equal to 15 percent of the net worth of the cor-
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It is clear that if more than fifteen per cent of the net worth of
the corporation is attributable to unrealized appreciation of subsec-
tion (e) assets, none of the exceptions are applicable and we revert
to section 341 prior to the 1958 amendment for determination of the
collapsible status of the corporation and the resulting taxability of a
particular shareholder. The definition of net worth is a normal
one, fair market value of assets at the close of a business day (as-
suming that there has been no distribution in complete liquidation)
less the liabilities at the close of the day. However, the determina-
tion of "fair market value" will have to be arbitrary in each in-
stance. The same article may have different fair market values for a
manufacturing corporation, a wholesale jobber and the retail outlet.
How is fair market value thus to be determined and, if there is one
price for the sale of stock, how is that sales price allocated to the
underlying assets? Is there good will in the sale of stock of a going
business as well as unrealized appreciation on the assets? Is each
asset appraised separately and then the total appraised asset value
applied proportionately to the sales price of the stock? Is an analysis
and allocation by the buyer after the sale binding on the seller of
stock in determining whether the fifteen per cent test opens the way
for one of the four exceptions? If there is established good will,
then the appreciation attributable to the subsection (e) assets should
be a smaller percentage of the total net worth.
"Fair market value," along with all of the other terms and incon-
gruities of subsection (e), must await court interpretation. It may
or may not follow standard definitions. The committee reports are
helpful in explaining the operation of the section, but without regu-
lations and without any court decisions on the subsection, only our
best guesses are available.
An individual attempting to bring himself within subsection (e)
prior to a sale would normally think about increasing the net worth
of the company by contribution to capital or paid-in surplus. This
would decrease the percentage of the total net worth attributable to
poration. This paragraph shall not apply to any sale or exchange of stock
to the issuing corporation or, in the case of a shareholder who owns more
than 20 per cent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation, to any
sale or exchange of stock by such shareholder to any person related to him(within the meaning of paragraph (8))." INT. REV. CODE o 1954, § 341
(e) (1).
The other tests involve distributions in certain liquidation where sections
333 and 337 are applicable and are not discussed here.
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the "ordinary income' assets. However, Congress anticipated this
and closed such a loophole.:partially." If the problem is thought of
soon enough, the desired result can be accomplished since the sub-
section requires only increases in net worth during the one-year
period prior to the sale date to be' eliminated from consideration as
to what constitutes fietworh, and these contributions within the
twelve-month period will be considered if it appears that there
was a bona fide business purpose for the transaction in respect of
which such amount. was received. 1 It is not clear why words
"it appears" are in the law. The section should read "if there was
not a bona fide business -purpose for the transaction in respect of
which such amount was received." Insertion of "it appears" could
mean that, evefi though there was no- bona fide business purpose, if it
appeared that there 'was a bona fide business purpose, the increase in
net worth should-be -considered. However, this surely was not the
intent of Congress, to permit window-dressing to govern such a
determination. The fixing of a stated period of one year is in keep-
ing with the attempt of Congress to set up objective tests in sub-
section (e).
Shareholders who have made sizeable loans to corporations have
considered the possibility of changing the loans to capital stock or
paid-in surplus more than one year prior to any sale since the refer-
ence to the "one-year period" in the net worth subsection would
normally indicate that increases in capital and surplus prior to that
period would not be removed from the net worth computation.
Under subsection (e), corporate ownership of property is at-
tributed to shareholders owning more than twenty per cent in value
of the outstanding stock, thus.affecting all of the shareholders, but
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(e) (7), defines net worth:
"For purposes of- this subsection, the net worth of a corporation, as of
any day, is the amount by which-
(A) (i) the .fair market value of all its assets at the close of such
day, plus
(ii) the amount of any distribution in complete liquidation made
by it on or before such day, exceeds
(B) All its liabilities at the close of such day.
For purposes of this paragraph, the net worth of a corporation as of any
day shall not take into account any increase in net worth during the one-
year period ending on such day to the extent attributable to any amount re-
ceived by it for stock, or as a contribution to capital or as paid-in surplus,
if it appears that there was not a bona fide business purpose for the transac-
tion in respect of which such amount was received."
" Ibid.
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the determination of what is ordinary income in the hands of the
shareholder raises still further questions when you have a securities
dealer or real estate dealer who also holds securities or property for
investment as distinguished from sale to customers. If the dealer
holds his stock of the corporation in his personal investment account
(according to section 1236(a). of the Code), the stock or securities
in the corporation under consideration should not be ordinary income
assets since the property would not be an ordinary income asset in
the hands of the more than twenty per cent stockholder. Thus, back
of every determination as to whether or not a more than twenty per
cent stockholder is a dealer lies a still further determination of how
that dealer held this stock-whether in his personal investment
portfolio or for sale to customers. The reason is that if a real estate
dealer does not hold his stock in this corporation (in which there
is appreciated real estate) for sale to his real estate customers, but
as his own personal investment, there should be no dealer taint to
deny the benefit of the exception to all of the shareholders, including
the dealer himself. It becomes a question of adequate proof of the
dealer's own attitude toward this specific investment. However, it
can be expected that such proof will be demanded by the Internal
Revenue Service if and when the question arises.
In the example at the beginning of this paper, if there had been
four shareholders owning twenty-five per cent of the corporate stock
each, one of them a real estate dealer, there would immediately have
arisen the question of the asset being an ordinary income asset
and treated so at the corporate level, thereby causing all shareholders
to lose any possibility of capital gains. Whether or not the real
estate dealer had an investment motive or intent would thus be of
major importance to all shareholders, himself included.
An easy way to remember the "corporate-level" and "share-
holder-level" tests is that the determination of what constitutes a
"subsection (e) asset" is a determination made at the corporate level,
and thus affects all shareholders. The definition in subparagraph
(e) (5) provides for the character of property in the hands of a
shareholder owning more than twenty per cent to become the cor-
porate character also. When the section is applying a "shareholder-
level" test, it refers to the shareholder. To the corporate-level deter-
mination of the net unrealized appreciation on a subsection (e) asset
is added the result of the shareholder-level tests as to the particular
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shareholder, and if the total sum is not more than fifteen per cent of
the net worth of the corporation, the sale or exchange of stock will
fall within the exception as to that shareholder. If there are no
dealer-shareholders in the corporation, then the only determinations
and computations are those of subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iv) of
Section 341(e) (5).
As to the shareholder owning more than twenty per cent in value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation, we must look into the
preceding three-year period and determine if he also owned more
than twenty per cent of any other corporation. If he did, a deter-
mination of the character of the assets of such other corporation is
required.
VII. BRAUNSTEIN
Mention has been made that the purpose of subsection (e) was
to prevent section 341 from converting into ordinary income what
would seem properly to be taxable only as capital gain. It now
seems apparent that just such a harsh, and surely unintended, result
does flow from the application of section 341 as it stood prior to
the addition of subsection (e). If we return to our fictitious Mr. A,
we will note that he might well have acquired the land and had
built and sold the office building without incorporating; and, had
he done so his gain would have been taxable only as a capital gain
-with his holding period, which might readily have extended to
six months or more, possibly being such as to allow him to pay
only at the long term capital gains rates. To the layman, as well
as to much of the bar, it would seem that section 341 should not
penalize the use of the corporate form by inflicting an ordinary in-
come tax on an otherwise capital gain transaction, and, until the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Braunstein v. Commissioner,"2 there was at least some good
reason to hope that section 341 would be *so interpreted as not to
"throw out the baby with the bath."
In the early case of Honaker Drig., Inc., v. Koehler,13 a corpora-
tion was formed to engage in the oil and gas drilling business, leases
being transferred to the corporation at the outset. The original
92 305 F.2d.949 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 65 (1963). See discussion,
Malouf, Braunstein affirmed, 341 Applies Despite Shareholder's Capital Gain
Statis, 19 J. TAXATION 80 (1963).
" 190 F. Supp. 287 (D.C. Kan. 1960).
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reason for the incorporation was for estate planning purposes, a
recommendation of taxpayer's counsel. An unsolicited offer resulted
in the sale of the properties for over a million dollars under a plan
of complete liquidation. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency
on the ground that the corporation was collapsible. The court held
the corporation not collapsible because, first, there was no intent to
liquidate before a substantial part of the income from the leases had
been realized and, second, because the corporation had realized a
substantial part of the income. The lack of "intent" was based on
the reasoning that since the gain would have been capital gain had
the individuals sold the properties, there was no need to utilize the
corporate form.
Following the Honaker Drig. decision came United States v.
Ivey"4 in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The facts of
Ivey will parallel many situations in ordinary business and invest-
ments. A corporation was formed by taxpayer and two other in-
dividuals, transferring to it a lot. Construction of an apartment
building was commenced and, before completion, the taxpayer sold
his stock for a 55,000 dollar profit, reporting it as capital gain.
The court'held section 341 not to be applicable where the share-
holder's gain would have been taxable as a capital gain had he
realized the gain directly rather than through the corporation. The
court also noted that the taxpayer's profit attributable to construc-
tion within six months of sale would be ordinary income.
In Ivey the court in effect eliminated the "view" requirement
where the gain would have been capital gain if the shareholder had
sold the constructed property, remanding the case for determination
as to whether the assets involved were property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and what por-
tion, if any, was capital gain.
Ivey dis-cussed the Honaker case, but did not mention that
Honaker was decided on the basis that the proscribed view was
absent. Instead, the Fifth Circuit pointed to Honaker as a case
which decided squarely: "If capital gains to the individual on sale
of property, then capital gains to the individual on sale of stock. '""
Following the Ivey case, the Second Circuit decided Braunstein
"294 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1961).
" See id. at 800, 804.
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v. Commissioner0 and in doing so expressly disagreed with the
Ivey decision. The court discussed the earlier Fifth Circuit decision,
but rejected the argument that, since gain on the sale of the prop-
erty would have been taxable as capital gain had it been realized by:
the individual, it was capital gain when the corporate stock was
sold. After concluding that the Tax Court's finding that the tax-
payers had the requisite "view" was correct and that more than
seventy per cent of the gain was attributable to the property con-
structed, the court reasoned that clearly the collapsible corporation
is an "all-or-nothing" proposition on capital gains and that
subsection (e) would have been unnecessary, if Ivey were cor-
rect, or else it overruled Ivey, clearly contrary to Congressional in-
tent.
Ivey was an attempt at judicial legislation because of the inap-
plicability of the purpose to the facts in the case. In Braunstein,
the Second Circuit refused to interpret section 341 in light of its
purpose where it would require the courts to extensively rewrite
clear statutory language.
With the conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari9 7 and on June 10, 1963, affirmed the Second Cir-
cuit decision. Since the grant of certiorari was limited to the ques-
tion on which there was conflict, no broad opinion was expected and
the final opinion was so limited, although the Court fell into the
common trap of generalizing about other areas of the section. The
only question decided was:
Whether Section 117(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
which provides that gain "from the sale or exchange * * * of stock
of a collapsible corporation" is taxable at ordinary income rather
than capital gain, is inapplicable in circumstances where the
stockholders would have been entitled to capital gains treatment
had they conducted the enterprise in their individual capacities
without utilizing a corporation. 8
The petitioner's arguments were rejected as "wholly inconsistent"
with the plain meaning of the statute.
In its reasoning, the Court restates the definition of a collapsible
corporation and then proceeds immediately to paraphrase and, in
305 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1962).
', Braunstein v. Commissioner, 371 U.S. 933 (1962).
8 Ibid.
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doing so, changes the concept somewhat. The opinion seems to
limit, by dictum, the application of section 341 to cases where the
view contemplates a sale or exchange of stock soon "after com-
pletion of construction." 9 If this is actually intended, a view to a
sale or exchange before completion of construction would not fall
within the purview of the statute. In fact, if we were to lend much
credence to this dictum, the Supreme Court would have held sec-
tion 341 inapplicable to Ivey since there the sale was before com-
pletion. It is submitted that this is not the intended result of the
statute, that there is no statutory language so limiting the section.
The Court has, in a case concerned with the plain meaning of statu-
tory language, created new problems by a dictum not compatible
with the statute.
Even though, as the Court states, there can be no question that
the purpose of the collapsible corporation section was to close the
loophole being used to convert ordinary income into capital gain,
there was nothing to require a determination that there be a tax
avoidance motive. Great stress is placed by the Court on the diffi-
culties of looking behind each sale or exchange to make an additional
determination of the tax status had each petitioner owned a share
in the enterprise individually and not through the corporation. Con-
gress chose the method by which it would close the loophole, failing
to leave open in every case the question, "Has there been a conver-
sion of ordinary income into capital gains?" With two examples
of the ramifications of attempting to determine whether or not the
individuals would have been entitled to capital gains absent the cor-
porate structure, the Court concluded on the note that Congress
did not intend for "the Commissioner and the courts to enter this
thicket."'100
The Braustein case was disappointing because of the limitation
of the grant of certiorari. It could have furnished new guidance on
three areas of section 341-the view, the seventy per cent rule and
the area of its actual decision. But because the conflict in the Cir-
cuits involved only the latter area, we do not have the assistance
of a Supreme Court pronouncement on when the view to sale must
arise or on whether retained rental income becomes "gain attribut-
able to the property."
" Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65, 71 (1963).100Id. at 73.
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But, neither Ivey nor Braunstein seem to affect the theory of the
Honaker Drg. case. Neither was decided in the "view" area based
on what the taxpayer's individual, as distinguished from corporate,
status would have been. In Honaker, it was merely evidence to indi-
cate the absence of the proscribed view and, as such, may still be
law, since it has not been overruled. Certainly, the individual status
should be emphasized in all such cases, although only as evidence as
to "view" ; but, in light of the Braunstein decision, no great. reliance
should be placed on the theory of Honaker. If another decision in
this same area arises in the Fifth Circuit, a decision of that court
hiat no proscribed "view" existed, in part because there was no need
to utilize a corporation for capital gains results, would probably
never be considered by the Supreme Court since the "conversion"'
is then merely some of the evidence considered in arriving at the
taxpayer's "view." Since the Supreme Court has indicated the
statute has a plain meaning in this area, strict construction of the
language may be argued to prevent the section's wider application.
With the new 1958 exceptions, taxpayers should attempt to
bring themselves within subsection (e). Taxpayers generally,
though, are unaware of the existence of section 341 and, even
though in some instances aware of it, probably fail to see any con-
nection between that provision and their decision to sell.
The safest avenue for the taxpayer is that of waiting three years
after completion or purchase before selling or exchanging stock.
Any other route is fraught with danger and even that avenue in-
volves a determination of when construction was completed. Surely,
one may hope for an amendment to section 341 which will make it
more readily understandable and less productive of litigation. Until
that day there is little the practitioner can do but hope that mean-
ingful and clarifying regulations will be proposed under subsection
(e), and that the sale or redemption of stock by his client, in any
corporation constructing, producing or manufacturing, will fall
within some exception.
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